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Abstract
Principles of economics predict that the costs associated with obtaining rewards can influence choice.
When individuals face choices between a smaller, immediate option and a larger, later option, they
often experience opportunity costs associated with waiting for delayed rewards because they must
forego the opportunity to make other choices. We evaluated how reducing opportunity costs affects
delay tolerance in capuchin monkeys. After choosing the larger option, in the High cost condition
subjects had to wait for the delay to expire, whereas in the Low cost different and Low cost same
conditions they could perform a new choice during the delay. To control for the effect of intake rate on
choices, the Low cost same condition had the same intake rate ratio as the High cost condition. We
found that capuchins attended both to intake rates and to opportunity costs. They chose the larger
option more often in the Low cost different and Low cost same conditions than in the High cost
condition, and more often in the Low cost different condition than in the Low cost same condition.
Understanding how non-human primates represent and use costs in making decisions not only helps to
develop theoretical frameworks to explain their choices but also addresses similarities with and
differences from human decision making. These outcomes provide insights into the origins of human
economic behaviour.
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INTRODUCTION
Intertemporal choices, i.e. economic decisions whose consequences occur at different times 1,
are pervasive in everyday life, with potentially critical implications for health and well-being as
humans devalue future options relatively to more immediate ones 2. Intertemporal choices have played a
key role in the debate around economic rationality and the deviations from normative models observed
in decision making over time3. Non-human animals also face intertemporal choices, most commonly
during foraging activities4, which have been investigated within the framework of Darwinian fitness
maximization5.
In the laboratory, researchers commonly test the ability to tolerate delay with the delay choice
task, in which subjects encounter a series of choices between a smaller option available sooner and a
larger option available later. Some researchers consider the high degree of delay tolerance observed in
humans on this task to be one of the key features distinguishing our species from non-human animals 3.
However, a fair comparison is highly problematic since, whereas humans usually answer
questionnaires about hypothetical choices, non-human animals are generally tested in operant tasks
with choices between food rewards. Questionnaires employed with humans and operant tasks
employed with non-human animals usually differ on several dimensions: reward delivery (always
present in operant tasks, often hypothetical in questionnaires), reward magnitude (small in operant
tasks, large in questionnaires), reward type (usually consumable rewards in operant tasks, usually
money in questionnaires), and length of delay (shorter in operant tasks, longer in questionnaires) 6. In
the few studies in which human subjects experienced operant tasks, they waited for delayed rewards
much less than when tested with questionnaires 7 and rarely for more than two minutes8-11. Interestingly,
when tested with the same methodology, humans waited less than chimpanzees 11 and exhibited a
preference for the larger, later option comparable to capuchin monkeys12.
A further, critical difference between operant tasks and questionnaires is in their opportunity
costs, defined as the loss of the potential opportunities of engaging in other activities after choosing an
option available after a certain amount of time. In operant tasks, opting for the delayed option forces
non-human animals to sustain the delay associated with their choice 11. In contrast, humans presented
with questionnaires do not suffer any restrictions on their activities during the delay. Thus, non-human
animals experience higher opportunity costs of waiting than humans, and this factor may devalue the
larger, later option in comparison to the smaller, sooner one (as waiting may prevent non-human
animals to engage in other activities and thus, possibly, collect other rewards).
A few previous studies investigated how alternative actions during the delay may allow
distraction and thus increase waiting time across different tasks. In delay maintenance tasks, in which
individuals had to wait to obtain a larger or more preferred reward rather than an immediately
available, less appealing reward, the opportunity to engage in alternative activities (e.g., manipulating
toys or key pecking) during the delay similarly improved delay tolerance in children 13-15 and nonhuman animals (pigeons16 and chimpanzees17). Similarly, rats preferred receiving sunflower seeds with
a husk, that they had to remove before consumption, to waiting for an equivalent amount of time
without doing anything and then receiving sunflower seeds without a husk18.
The present study aims to evaluate, for the first time, how reducing opportunity costs affects
preferences in a delay choice task in tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.), a South-American
primate species whose choice behaviour in delay choice tasks has been extensively investigated12,19-21.
To explore the role of opportunity costs on intertemporal choice, we manipulated whether capuchins
could make additional choices during the delay. The ability to make choices during the delay reduces
opportunity costs by allowing animals to gain further rewards while waiting. Subjects experienced
three experimental conditions. In the High cost condition, if the subject chooses the larger option, s/he
must wait for the delay to expire to receive the reward and then the intertrial interval starts (i.e., the
2

standard way that most operant studies are conducted). In the Low cost different condition, if the
subject chooses the larger option, the intertrial interval starts immediately after choice and, while the
delay is still expiring, the subject can proceed to a new choice. However, allowing another choice
during the delay increases the overall intake rate for the subject (defined as the amount of food
acquired per unit of time5) in the Low cost different condition compared to the High cost condition,
which could alter choice22. To assess the possible effect of changing the intake rate on subjects’
choices, we carried out the Low cost same condition, in which the intake rate ratio (larger option intake
rate/smaller option intake rate) was the same as in the High cost condition. In each condition, we
measured the proportion of choices of the larger, later option. We expected that: (1) if subjects ignore
both intake rates and opportunity costs, no difference will emerge across conditions; (2) if subjects
attend to intake rates in general but not to the opportunity costs per se: Low cost different > Low cost
same ~ High cost; (3) if subjects attend to opportunity costs regardless of intake rates: Low cost
different ~ Low cost same > High cost; (4) if subjects attend to both opportunity costs and intake rates:
Low cost different > Low cost same > High cost.
METHODS
Subjects
We tested 10 adult capuchin monkeys, belonging to four social groups, housed at the Primate
Center of the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Rome. All subjects had extensive experience in
cognitive tasks and most of them had previously participated in studies in which the delay choice task
was employed (Table 1). Only one subject did not have any previous experience with the delay choice
task. Seven subjects had also previously participated in a pilot experiment in which a similar
methodology to the one used in the current study was employed (Supplementary Materials, Table S1).
Table 1. Subjects’ sex, age (years), and presentation order
Subject

Sex Age

Order of condition presentation

Previous experience
in delay choice tasks

Previous participation in
opportunity cost pilot experiment

Gal

M

28

Low Same, High, Low Different

12,19,20,21

Yes

Paprica

F

29

High, Low same, Low Different

19, 20, 21

Yes

Roberta

F

32

High, Low Different, Low Same

12, 19,37, 20

No

Robin Hood

M

21

High, Low Different, Low Same

12, 19, 37, 20, 21

Yes

Robinia

F

24

Low Same, Low Different, High

19, 20, 21

Yes

Robiola

F

20

Low Same, High, Low Different

None

No

Robot

M

23

High, Low same, Low Different

12, 19, 20, 21

Yes

Rucola

F

18

Low Different, Low Same, High

19

No

Sandokan

M

18

Low Different, Low Same, High

12, 19, 37, 20, 21

Yes

Saroma

F

17

Low Different, High, Low Same

11,31,40,41

Yes

Each capuchin group was housed in indoor–outdoor compartments. The outdoor compartments
measured 53.2-374.0 m3, depending on group size, and the two indoor compartments measured 25.4 m 3
in total for each group. All compartments were furnished with wooden perches, tree trunks and
branches. We tested subjects individually in one of the two indoor compartments. We separated
3

subjects for individual testing by first splitting the group into smaller units using sliding doors and then
allowing the subject to enter the indoor compartment. Testing occurred between 09:30 and 13:30 h, at
least two hours after capuchins were released from the indoor compartments (where food is available
overnight) and before their main meal, which takes place in the afternoon, when fresh fruits, vegetables
and monkey chow are provided. Water was available ad libitum.
Apparatus
Two food options (see below) were presented to capuchins on a platform (65 x 40 x 16 cm)
with two transparent boxes (9.5 x 20 x 15 cm each), 28 cm apart (Figure 1). We used small pieces of
peanuts (each food item corresponding to 1/8 of peanut, weighing on average ± standard error 0.11 ±
0.004 g). Food options were placed under the transparent boxes, each covered by a coloured upsidedown cup. For each condition (see below), a unique pair of differently coloured cups covered the two
options and the assignment of the cups to each option was counterbalanced across subjects. We
covered the food options by coloured cups to avoid the possibility that, if food items were fully visible,
tolerance to delay could be at least partially confounded with impulsivity towards food quantity at the
time of choice12,23-25. Subjects could choose one of the two options by inserting a finger in the hole
(diameter: 2 cm) of one of the two boxes, through one of two openings in the wire mesh (8.5 cm x 3.8
cm each), aligned with the boxes. Beside the choice apparatus, we set up a wooden table (65 x 13 x 26
cm) on which we positioned three dark ceramic plates (diameter 12 cm), clearly visible from the
capuchins’ testing compartment. In all conditions, following the choice of the larger option, the
experimenter placed the food in one of the three plates for the whole duration of the delay associated to
this option (see below). Following the choice of the smaller option, the experimenter directly handed
the food to the subject.

Fig. 1 Experimental set-up in the Low cost same condition. Robin hood (an adult male) has just chosen the larger, later
option and the experimenter has placed it on the central plate, out of his reach. Another reward associated with the choice
of the larger, later option in a previous trial is on the left plate. The experimenter will provide Robin Hood with the rewards
when their respective delays expire.

4

Procedure
We used an adaptation of the delay choice task with a fixed-delay procedure 11,12. Each subject
experienced three experimental conditions: High cost, Low cost same, and Low cost different. The
order in which the three conditions were presented was counterbalanced across subjects (Table 1).
In all conditions, subjects chose between a smaller food amount available sooner and a larger
food amount available later. In the High cost and Low cost different conditions, the smaller, sooner
option was one food item available after 2 s (Figure 2a and b). In the Low cost same condition, the
smaller, sooner option consisted of three food items available after 2 s (Figure 2c). In all conditions, the
larger, later option was six food items available after an 80-s delay. This delay was chosen because it
corresponds to the average delay tolerated at indifference point by the same capuchins previously
tested in a delay choice task with an adjusting delay procedure19.

Fig. 2 Graphical representation of experimental conditions. Each subfigure represents three example trials in which the
subject chooses the larger, later option. The yellow dots represent the number of food items. In all conditions, the ITI was
20 s, the delay to the smaller option was 2 s, and the delay to the larger option was 80 s. (a) In the High cost condition, ITIs
and the next trial did not start until the subject consumed all of the food from the previous trial. (b and c) In the Low cost
different and Low cost same conditions, if the subject chose the larger, later option, the ITI for the next trial started
immediately after the choice.

Intake rates
The critical difference between the High cost and the Low cost different conditions is that in the
latter the subject can proceed to the next choice trial while the delay(s) associated with choices made
on previous trials are still expiring (Figure 2b). However, in this way, the total waiting time decreases
and consequently the intake rate 1 associated with the choice of choosing the larger option is three times
higher in the Low cost different condition than in the High cost condition. In fact, if in the Low cost
different condition the subject always chooses the larger option, the intake rate is 0.18 (intake rate = (#
trials × # food items) / ((# trials × ITI) + delay)) for the larger option but remains 0.05 for the smaller
option. In the High cost condition, if the subject always chooses the smaller option, the intake rate is
The (long-term) intake rate is the amount of food acquired per unit time5. In a delay choice task, it depends on the number
of trials, number of food items obtained after choice, intertrial interval (ITI), handling times for processing rewards, and
delay. Since handling times for capuchins with this type of food are negligible, we ignored them for ease of calculation.
1
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0.05 (intake rate = # food items / ITI), whereas if the subject always chooses the larger option, the
intake rate is 0.06 (intake rate = # food items / (ITI + delay)).
To rule out the possibility that a stronger preference for the larger option in the Low cost
different condition is due to its higher intake rate (compared to the High cost condition), we ran also the
Low cost same condition, in which the subject chooses between three food items available after 2 s and
six food items available after 80 s. In this way, the intake rate ratio (larger option intake rate/smaller
option intake rate) is the same as in the High cost condition. If in the Low cost same condition the
subject always chooses the smaller option, the intake rate is 0.15, whereas if s/he always chooses the
larger option the intake rate is 0.18, as in the Low cost different condition. Thus, the intake rate ratio is
1.2 in both the High cost and Low cost same conditions, whereas it is 3.6 in the Low cost different
condition.
Experimental sessions
Sessions consisted of two forced-choice trials with only one option available for familiarization
(one with the smaller option and one with the larger option), and six free-choice trials, in which
capuchins could choose between the smaller option and the larger option. The forced-choice trials were
presented at the beginning of each session, alternating their order and position (left or right) between
sessions. The order and the position of the six free-choice trials were pseudo-randomized throughout
the session. The intertrial interval was 20 s. Each subject received one session per day and, in each
condition, subjects were tested up until a criterion of five consecutive sessions in which the number of
choices for the larger, later option diverged by no more than one unit. This resulted in subjects
experiencing 5-34 sessions (Figure S1).
The apparatus was placed in front of the indoor compartment. Two experimenters tested the
subjects: experimenter 1 sat in front of the subject’s indoor compartment, behind the apparatus, and
experimenter 2 sat next to experimenter 1. In each trial, experimenter 1 baited the apparatus while
experimenter 2 blocked the subject’s visual access to the apparatus by means of an opaque screen so
that the subject could neither observe the baiting process nor reach the boxes during baiting. After
baiting, experimenter 2 lifted the opaque screen and experimenter 1 pushed the apparatus towards the
wire mesh, so that the subject could make his/her choice. Both experimenters refrained from looking at
the boxes to avoid providing visual cues to the subject.
In all experimental conditions, if the subject chose the smaller option, experimenter 1 directly
handed the food to the subject after a 2-s delay. As soon as the subject put the last piece of food in
his/her mouth, experimenter 2 replaced the opaque screen and, after the intertrial interval, the next trial
began. If the subject chose the larger option, the smaller option was removed, the experimenter placed
the food items in one of the plates placed on the wooden table positioned beside the apparatus (Figure
1) and, depending on the condition, a different procedure was employed. In the High cost condition, the
subject had to wait for the 80-s delay to expire before performing the subsequent choice. Then, the
subject received the food and, after the intertrial interval, the next trial began (Figure 2a). In contrast, in
both the Low cost same and the Low cost different conditions, when the subject chose the larger option,
the intertrial interval started immediately after his/her choice, while the 80-s delay was running. At the
end of the intertrial interval, the subject received the next choice trial. Only when the 80-s delay
expired, the subject received the food amount associated to the previous choice trial. The same
procedure was repeated until the last trial (Figures 2b and c). The only difference between the two Low
cost conditions was the use of one food item in the Low cost different condition (as in the High cost
condition) compared to three food items in the Low cost same condition (Table 2).
Before the onset of each experimental condition, subjects experienced three familiarization
sessions consisting of 16 forced-choice trials with only one option available (either the smaller one or
the larger one). We pseudo-randomized their order and position (left or right) within each session.
After each choice, we presented the food to the subject following the same procedure described above.
6

Table 2. Intake rate comparison across conditions
Condition

Small
amount
(2-s
delay)

Large
amount
(80 s
delay)

Smaller,
Larger,
Ratio of
sooner
later long- long-term
long-term term rate
rates
rate
(LL:SS)*

High cost

1

6

0.05

0.06

1.2

0.5

0.08

0.15

Low cost
different

1

6

0.05

0.18

3.6

0.5

0.08

0.15

1.2

1.5

0.08

0.05

Low cost same
3
6
0.15
0.18
*Ratios > 1 predict choice for LL, ratios < 1 predict choice for SS.

Smaller,
Larger,
sooner
later shortshort-term term rate
rate

Ratio of
short-term
rates
(LL:SS)*

Experimenter 2 collected data on a laptop running a software (developed by Uwe Czienskowski
at Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany) that automatically tracked delays
and intertrial intervals; experimenter 2 also signalled to experimenter 1 when to deliver each food
amount and when to present a new choice. Data collection was carried out between July and November
2018.
Data analysis
We conducted both frequentist and Bayesian analyses. For Bayesian analyses, we used the brms
package in R to fit models using a generic, weakly informative prior: normal (0, 1). We report Bayes
factors (BF) to provide evidence for the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis 26. Data
were analysed using R statistical software version 4.0.227. Data and R scripts are available as
Supplementary Materials and on Dryad Data Repository (https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.mcvdncjxd).
RESULTS
We analysed data pertaining only to the last five sessions (i.e., upon reaching choice stability).
First, since data were not normally distributed (Shapiro Wilk test: High cost: W = 0.688, df = 10, p =
0.001, Low-cost different: W = 0.828, df = 10, p = 0.032, Low-cost same: W = 0.533, df = 10, p <
0.001), we performed one-sample Wilcoxon tests to determine if preferences differed from chance
(0.5). Capuchins preferred the smaller, sooner option over the larger, later option in all conditions
(High cost: V = 0, p = 0.005, BF > 100; Low-cost different: V = 4, p = 0.019, BF = 10.5; Low-cost
same: V = 7, p = 0.039, BF = 10.9). Then, we conducted logistic Generalized Linear Mixed Models
and used forwards and backwards model selection, likelihood ratio tests, and comparisons of Bayes
factors of models to find the best model. A likelihood ratio test shows that the model including the
random effects of subject performed better than the model without random effects (Χ2 = 57.61, p <
0.001, BF > 100). We then tested models with condition and trial number as fixed effects. We found
that the model with condition fit better than the model with no fixed effects (Χ2 = 60.19, p < 0.001) and
adding trial number did not improve model fit over condition only (Χ2 = 0.07, p = 0.78; Table S2).
Similarly, the Bayesian analysis found extreme evidence for the condition model over the model with
no fixed effects (BF > 100) and strong evidence for the condition only model over the model with
condition and trial number (BF = 16.0). From the contrasts, it emerged that each condition is different
from the other (High cost - Low cost different: estimate = -2.21, SE = 0.33, df = Inf, z ratio = -6.63, p
<0.001, BF > 100; High cost - Low cost same: estimate = -1.61, SE = 0.34, df = Inf, z ratio = -4.69, p
<0.001, BF > 100; Low cost same - Low cost different: estimate = 0.61, SE = 0.22, df = Inf, z ratio =
2.74, p = 0.017, BF = 5.0; p value adjustment: Tukey method for comparing a family of three
estimates, Figure 3a). Nonetheless, the subject Robot appears to be a clear outlier in those data, with a
7

mean choice over the three conditions which was 7.0 standard deviations larger than the overall mean
(Figure 3a).
(a)

(b)

Fig. 3 Proportion of choices of the larger, later option in the three experimental conditions for (a) all subjects and (b)
without the outlier Robot. Grey lines represent the mean proportion of choices of the larger, later option for each
individual. Black circles and error bars represent means and within-subjects 95% confidence intervals.

When we performed the same analysis without the subject Robot, both frequentist and Bayesian
approaches favour the same model with subject as a random effect and condition as a fixed effect
(Table S3). From the contrasts, we confirmed that each condition is different from the other (High cost
- Low cost different: estimate = -2.95, SE = 0.44, df = Inf, z ratio = -6.70, p < 0.001, BF > 100; High
cost - Low cost same: estimate: -1.18, SE = 0.48, df = Inf, z ratio = -2.45, p = 0.038, BF = 6.3; Low cost
same - Low cost different: estimate = 1.77, SE = 0.29, df = Inf, z ratio = 6.11, p < 0.001, BF > 100; p
value adjustment: Tukey method for comparing a family of three estimates, Figure 3b).
DISCUSSION
Overall, capuchin monkeys chose the larger, later option more in the Low cost different and Low
cost same conditions, in which they moved to the next choice trial while the delay associated to the
previous choice trial was still expiring, than in the High cost condition, in which they had to wait for
the delay to expire before moving to the next choice trial. Our results extend to the delay choice task
the findings obtained in children, chimpanzees, pigeons, and rats in other self-control tasks 13-18 that
alternative actions during delays enhance the ability to wait. Whereas previous studies explored the
effect of opportunity costs on delay of gratification by providing distractions or alternative activities
during the delays, but not additional rewards, our study was, to our knowledge, the first one to allow
for additional choices and rewards during the delays. The current paradigm mimics human
intertemporal choices in which, after choosing larger, later payoffs (e.g., investing in retirement funds),
we continue to make additional choices while waiting for our investments to pay back. Manipulating
opportunity costs by changing the intertemporal choice architecture is markedly different from just
providing relief from the stress of waiting via distractions. Although we believe that the opportunity of
performing any activity (playing with toys, making additional choices, etc.) during a delay may release
the discomfort of waiting, we cannot definitively conclude that this was the case in the current study.
Future research should quantify behavioural correlates of stress (as scratching and other self-directed
8

behaviours28) when subjects are allowed, or not, to perform additional choices during the delay. The
question of opportunity costs raises important implications for different types of scenarios in which
animals must wait for delayed rewards in natural decision-making contexts. Our findings support the
view that animals may tolerate delays better when opportunity costs are low and they can engage in
other actions and decisions during the delay. Caching, or hiding food for later consumption, is a good
example of this29. Many species cache food for consumption days, weeks, or even months later 30. Not
only can the cachers engage in many other activities while waiting to recover their caches, but they can
also continue to cache more. Likewise, gummivores such as common marmosets can chew on tree bark
and commence other activities (include more tree gouging) while waiting for the sap to exude. Other
forms of waiting, however, do not allow for alternative activities during the delay. Ambush, stalking,
and coursing hunters cannot engage in other activities during the hunt. Thus, though this hunting
strategy does require waiting, these types of hunters may not tolerate delay as much as species that can
pursue other actions during the delay.
Choices of the larger, later option were not only affected by minimizing opportunity costs, but
also by the long-term intake rate ratio. Capuchins chose the larger option more in the Low cost different
condition (i.e., the condition with the highest long-term intake rate ratio) than in the Low cost same
condition (in which the opportunity costs were comparable to the Low cost different condition, but the
long-term intake rate ratio was smaller). However, capuchins did not choose in a way to maximize their
long-term intake rate. In order to do so, they should have systematically chosen the larger, later
options, which offered the highest long-term intake rates. Instead, capuchins consistently preferred the
smaller, sooner option in all conditions. This finding suggests that, whereas across conditions
capuchins are sensitive to the long-term intake rate ratio, within conditions they maximize short-term
intake rates2 rather than long-term intake rates (similarly to how European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris,
and cotton-top tamarins, Saguinus oedipus, may do31-33).
In an optimal foraging framework, impulsivity represents an irrational behaviour, since it does
not lead to maximizing energetic gain. It has been proposed that a consistent preference for smaller,
sooner options in the delay choice task is motivated by economic discounting, according to which a
delayed option is devalued over time because of collection risks and lost opportunity costs 34.
Nonetheless, in an ecological rationality framework35, apparent impulsive choices may be preferred as
they lead to long-term gains in other choice contexts, as in patch exploitation, which are more common
than intertemporal choices in wild settings36. The computational efficiency of capuchins in maximizing
their short-term intake rate likely stems from their extensive experience in delay choice tasks12,19-21,37.
Overall, our findings support the view that a decision maker preferring the smaller, sooner option over
the larger, later option in a delay choice task may be an efficient, rational rate maximizer in other
choice contexts, rather than an impulsive, irrational individual2,5,22,38.
In sum, our data suggest that, in a delay choice task administered in a captive setting,
capuchins’ choices for the larger, later option were affected by a reduction of the opportunity costs.
Nonetheless, even when opportunity costs were minimized, by allowing capuchins to perform other
choices while waiting for the delayed reward, they pursued short-term intake rate maximization. These
findings contribute to the growing interest for the role of costs in intertemporal choice behaviour 6,11,39,40
and suggest the need for further experimental studies aimed at measuring their impacts across various
species both with the same methodology and when different delays and reward magnitudes are
involved. Future studies should also systematically explore whether mere food consumption during the
delay, rather than performing additional choices and being rewarded, would affect preference for the
larger, later reward. A better understanding of how opportunity costs affect decision-making over time
Whereas long-term intake rates include all time components in the calculations (e.g., delay, intertrial interval), short-term
rates focus on the amount of food accumulated as a function of the time between choice and receipt of food (# food
items/delay), ignoring the intertrial interval.
2
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in non-human primates may provide insights into human economic behaviour by constraining models
and explaining the origins of how we make decisions. Though we know of no direct test of the role of
opportunity costs on human intertemporal choice, their behaviour in operant tasks, in which they
choose smaller, sooner options frequently 7,8,10,11, suggests sensitivity to opportunity costs as well.
Hopefully, this will be a matter for future research.
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